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Introduction 
During the period from 1947 to 1952 Norway 
and Denmark moved from being non-aligned 
states to becoming members of an integrated 
Western alliance. This article will discuss the 
role and importance of American aid 
programmes in this process. Two main 
questions will be discussed. Firstly, why did 
Denmark and Norway accept financial and 
military aid from the United States? How 
important were immediate economic needs, and 
to what extent did other foreign policy 
considerations come into play? Secondly, to 
what extent could it be argued that the prospect 
of obtaining aid from the United States 
contributed to pulling Norway and Denmark 
towards the West and integrating them into the 
Western security system? 
The article will start by discussing 
Norwegian and Danish motives for accepting 
Marshall aid. The second part will examine the 
relative importance of Marsh all aid and military 
assistance for Denmark's and Norway's 
decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
last part will look at how the American arms 
assistance programmes in the two countries 
were implemented and discuss how and to what 
extent this contributed to the integration of the 
two countries into the political and military 
structures of the Atlantic bloc. 
Both Danish and Norwegian historians have 
analysed the foreign policies of their countries 
as the result of an interaction between security, 
economics and domestic factors. 1 There are, 
however, certain differences in emphasis. When 
foreign policy decisions and strategies are 
explained, Norwegian historians have tended to 
emphasise considerations of general foreign 
policy orientation, and pay particular attention to 
the security dimensions of the actual policies.2 
Although it might be an exaggeration to claim 
that the analytical emphasis of Norwegian Cold 
War historiography has been based solelY'on the 
primacy of security, there has certainly been a 
tendency to stress how security concerns 
played a prominent position in the minds of 
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foreign policy decision-makers. This is partly a 
reflection of the topics and perspectives that 
have been explored, however, and there are 
signs that the emphasis on security is becoming 
less prominent in more recent research.3 
Moreover, the most prominent Norwegian 
historian who has been doing research into the 
Marshall Plan, Helge Pharo, has always stressed 
the interaction between economy, security, 
ideology and culture. Danish historians, 
meanwhile, have put somewhat greater 
emphasis on economic considerations and the 
domestic political situation when explaining 
Danish policies in the same period. Doubtless, 
the differences of emphasis partly reflect real 
dissimilarities in the setting and background for 
foreign policy decisions in the two countries 
during the early postwar period. However, as 
will be seen from this article, a comparison 
between the two countries stressing the 
reciprocal relationship between domestic affairs, 
economy and security concerns, shows that the 
similarities are as striking as the differences. 
1 - Bridgebuilding and the Decision 
to Accept Marshal! Aid 
Both Norway and Denmark adopted a non-
aligned stand after the end of the Second World 
War. In both countries this policy was referred 
to as "bridgebuilding". There was no going back 
to the policies of the prewar years, however, 
where non-alignment in peace aimed at 
neutrality in war. Such a policy had failed 
miserably in 1940, and neither Denmark nor 
Norway believed that it would be possible to 
remain outside a new European war. The foreign 
policy of Denmark and Norway in 1945-47 was 
hence based on collective security through the 
United Nations and, ultimately, on an alliance 
with the Western powers, should war break out. 
Despite their official non-aligned status, both 
countries kept intimate military ties to Britain. 
Both supplied brigade groups to the British 
occupation zone of Germany. For Norway, the 
relationship with Britain was so close that it 
could be termed a "semi-alliance". Norway 
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bought large amounts of military equipment 
from Britain, and Norwegian personnel were 
educated at British military schools. 
The 'bridgebuilding' concept seemed to 
indicate that the countries would act as active 
mediators between the great powers, but their 
actual foreign policies were marked by a low 
international profile and avoided taking a stand 
in the emerging conflicts between the former 
wartime allies. Internally, both countries 
concentrated on rebuilding the economy after 
the war. Norway had experienced severe 
wartime damage and the government embarked 
on an ambitious reconstruction programme for 
industry and infrastructure. Throughout the 
period, Norway had a majority Labour 
government, whereas Denmark had weaker 
governments, a minority Liberal government 
from 1945-47, a minority Social Democrat 
government from 1947-1950, and a Liberal-
Conservative coalition from 1950-53. 
Of the two countries, Norway was most 
sceptical to George C. Marshall's Harvard 
speech in 1947. After some hesitation, the 
government still chose to participate in the Paris 
negotiations. Helge Pharo was the first to 
present a study on Norway and the Marshall 
Plan based on primary sources in 1976, and he 
has later expanded his views in a number of 
articles.' Pharo documented that both the initial 
Norwegian hesitation and the subsequent 
decision to participate was taken on the basis of 
a broad assessment of a number of factors, 
such as the development of international affairs, 
the foreign policy orientatiol\ of Norway, general 
trade patterns of the country and domestic 
sentiments. Thus, the decision was based on 
what Pharo terms 'general foreign policy 
considerations', rather than on any single factor. 
In so arguing, he differed from the first 
historical accounts, which had put primary 
emphasis on the immediate need for financial 
aid.' 
Pharo showed how the Norwegian 
government initially viewed the offer of 
American aid as a move that would deepen the 
division of Europe. Accepting Marshall aid could 
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create problems for Norway's declared stand as 
a bridgebuilder between the emerging blocs, and 
Norway preferred to remain outside if it proved 
to be economically possible.' Moreover, when 
the plan was presented, it was still unclear how 
other European states would react. The 
Norwegian government therefore avoided 
committing itself during the first weeks after the 
Harvard speech. 
Economical factors played an important role 
in the deliberations of the Norwegian 
government, but Pharo was able give a more 
qualified analysis than the earliest accounts. In 
general, there could be no doubt that Norway 
needed an influx of foreign currency in order to 
fulfil the ambitious reconstruction programme. 
During the winter and spring of 1947, the 
Norwegians viewed the foreign exchange 
situation as rather difficult. At the time of 
Marshall's speech, however, the picture that 
was presented from the Ministry of Finance 
appeared to be somewhat less bleak. It seemed 
that Norway could, if necessary, proceed for 
another year and a half without an influx of 
foreign currency.7 This impression, however, 
was partly the result of wishful thinking. To a 
certain degree the figures had been consciously 
arranged to support the notion that Norway 
could choose not to accept aid. Moreover, the 
Norwegian statistical material itself was 
inadequate and failed to predict an urgent dollar 
shortage that was not far away when Marshall 
made his speech. Because of a certain self-
delusion and misleading statistic figures, the 
Norwegian debate on whether to participate 
hence took place without the same feeling of 
immediate economic urgency as in Denmark, 
where it was already beyond doubt that the 
foreign exchange situation was deteriorating 
alarmingly. 
Moreover, leading Norwegian Labour 
economists predicted an impending postwar 
depression in the world economy. Just as after 
the First World War, they claimed, scarcity 
would soon be followed by over-production. 
Consequently, the dollar shortage would soon 
cease to be a problem.' In other words, wishful 
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thinking, inadequate statistics and ideologically 
coloured anticipation influenced the Norwegian 
perception of the situation. 
There were, however, many general factors 
that spoke in favour of joining the Marshall Plan, 
and the development during the weeks of 
Norwegian deliberation made these factors 
increasingly significant. It soon became clear 
that both Denmark and Sweden intended to 
participate - and Norway placed much emphasis 
on Scandinavian cohesion. When Sweden, with 
its well-established tradition of neutrality, could 
accept the offer, it was more difficult to argue 
that Norway should not. Moreover, the 
enthusiasm of the British Labour government 
felt both compelling and reassuring for the 
Norwegian government. Among the great 
powers, Norway felt most close to Britain, both 
for historical and ideological reasons. Moreover, 
as time passed it gradually became clear that all 
European countries would accept the offer, 
except for the East European states and Finland. 
Thus, the participants in the Marshall Plan came 
to include all the countries that Norway felt 
close to politically, culturally and historically.9 
Moreover, the participants included all of 
Norway's principal trade partners. 
Norwegian domestic sentiments had been 
among the factors that called for caution during 
the first weeks after the Americans made their 
offer. It was feared that an acceptance would 
alienate significant groups within the ruling 
Labour Party. 10 As other social democrat 
governments in Europe signalled their support of 
the Marshall Plan, such concerns were 
somewhat less relevant, and it seemed that it 
would create more domestic stirrings if the plan 
were rejected. 
As all the West European states would 
participate, a decision to abstain seemed to be 
more of a deviation from the present political 
course than to accept. To reject the offer 
would, as a leading adviser to the foreign 
minister expressed it, 'be a demonstrative 
alignment with the eastern bloc'·11 By 
participating in the Marshall plan, the 
government thus chose the alternative that 
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seemed to have the least direct implications 
from a general foreign policy point of view. 
The case of Denmark was somewhat 
different from the Norwegian one. Immediate 
economic needs seem to have played an 
important role in the Danish decision to accept 
Marshall aidY Denmark's foreign currency 
reserves were running out, and the dollar deficit 
appeared to have become chronic. The 
economic situation hence seemed to leave 
Denmark with little choice. Still, Denmark did 
not initially expect to receive substantial 
amounts of direct financial aid from the United 
States. However, Danish authorities expected 
that the programme would have a very positive 
effect for Denmark's European trade partners 
and thereby stimulate demand for Danish goods. 
Therefore, Denmark, just like Norway, had a 
general interest in the successful realisation of 
the plan. It should also be noted that foreign 
policy considerations influenced the Danish 
choice as they did the Norwegian one: it was 
feared that a rejection would be interpreted as 
pro-Soviet. I' 
At a general level, the similarities between the 
Norwegian and the Danish motives for 
accepting Marshall aid are striking. Both 
countries had general economic and political 
interests that made it difficult to reject the 
American offer. The main difference was that 
the Danes perceived the currency situation as 
being almost desperate at the time when the 
offer was made, whereas the Norwegians felt 
that they still had some room for manoeuvre. 
Danish historians have hence emphasised the 
economic motives behind the Danish decision. 
Norwegian historians, noticeably Helge Pharo, 
have explored general foreign policy 
considerations in order to explain both the initial 
Norwegian hesitation and the decision to 
participate. Thus, whereas both Danish and 
Norwegian historians have pointed to a 
combination of factors behind the decision to 
join the Marshall Plan, Norwegian accounts have 
tended to put more emphasis on the issue of 
foreign policy orientation, including the implicit 
security implications of the decision. 
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Although the Norwegians were initially more 
reluctant to accept the American offer than were 
the Danes, both countries chose the same 
strategy at the Paris negotiations. In cooperation 
with Sweden, Norway and Denmark set out to 
restrict the scope of institutionalisation and 
cooperation between the participants. This 
strategy was meant to protect national 
sovereignty and minimalise the implications for 
their non-aligned status. In order to avoid the 
impression that they had abandoned the policy 
of bridgebuilding, Denmark and Norway were 
both eager to underline that their decision to 
participate was a purely economic one. I' 
Ironically, then, there were political reasons 
behind the strong emphasis on the economic 
aspects of the decision. For the Norwegians, 
this strategy was initially based on the 
impression that the currency situation, although 
difficult, was not precarious. The Norwegians 
therefore felt that they could negotiate from a 
position of relative strength, and for political 
motives, the Norwegian estimates for dollar aid 
were set very low. All three Scandinavian 
countries argued that the aid should be 
distributed through the Economic Commission 
for Europe (ECE) under UN auspices, and they 
adopted the same stand as did the Russians 
before they withdrew from the negotiations, 
namely that the receivers should present their 
needs individually, and that aid should be 
distributed on this basis rather than collectively 
(the so-called shopping list approach).!' 
During the negotiations the Scandinavian 
stand proved infeasible. Faced by American 
pressure the West European countries had to 
accept a semi-permanent institutional system of 
cooperation and coordination for the distribution 
of aid. Denmark was the first of the three 
Scandinavian countries to signal her will to 
accept these terms, and Norway soon followed. 
Their decision can partly be explained by 
economic considerations. Denmark's difficult 
economic situation goes a long way to explain 
why the country chose to give in at an earlier 
stage than Norway and Sweden. However, 
Norway also had to reassess her economic 
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position. In August 1947 it turned out that the 
cautiously optimist Norwegian assessment of 
the foreign exchange balance during the last 
weeks had been unfounded, and that Norway in 
fact faced a severe dollar crisis. This realisation 
probably tempered the Norwegian wish to resist 
American demands, although there was still 
widespread sceptisism among the Norwegians. I ' 
In addition to the difficult economic situation, 
general political and diplomatic considerations 
made it undesirable for both countries to 
become the one to be blamed for an eventual 
breakdown of the negotiations. I' 
2 - Scandinavian or Atlantic 
Alliance? 
During the Marshall Plan negotiations, a primary 
aim for the Norwegian government was to avoid 
making moves that would be inconsistent with 
the official non-aligned bridgebuilding doctrine. 
However, the non-aligned policies of 
bridge building were based on the basic premise 
that there remained a certain understanding and 
cooperation between the victorious great powers 
after the war. All the time Norwegian policy 
makers had operated with a conscious fall back 
position: should the great powers drift into 
confrontation, Norway would have to turn west. 
Consequently, towards the end of 1947, 
Norwegian foreign policy makers were 
beginning to rethink the basis of Norwegian 
foreign policy in the light of growing 
international tensions.lB The Danes also felt 
uneasy in the face of international developments, 
but adopted a waiting attitude. 
The actual consequences of the Norwegian 
reorientation from the late autumn of 1947 were 
unclear at first. The foreign policy elite. of the 
Norwegian Labour Party would no doubt have 
preferred a solution where Norway - or, even 
better, Scandinavia - was offered an 
unconditional security guarantee from Britain 
and the United States. However, such an 
alternative turned out to be wishful thinking. 
During the spring and summer of 1948 two 
main alternatives came into the foreground for 
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both Denmark and Norway: either the 
establishment of a Scandinavian defence union, 
or membership in the emerging Atlantic Pact. 
Nicolaj Petersen has analysed and compared 
Danish and Norwegian security policies in the 
transitory period 1948-1949. 19 He concludes 
that both countries considered a Scandinavian 
defence union to be the preferred solution, with 
membership in the Atlantic Treaty as a fall back 
position if negotiations broke down. Continued 
isolated neutrality was seen as an unacceptable 
option for both governments, perhaps most so 
to the Norwegian one. There was, however, an 
important difference between the preferences of 
the two countries. Denmark would prefer a non-
aligned (neutral) Scandinavian union, but would 
also accept a union with ties to the West, if 
Norway and Sweden agreed to such an 
arrangement. For Norway, however, it was an 
absolute condition that a Scandinavian union had 
an "opening to the West". The exact scope of 
this "opening" (or connection) could be a matter 
of negotiation, but at a minimum it would have 
to include military staff consultations aiming to 
agree on arrangements for cooperation in war 
and an agreement of preferential treatment 
regarding arms deliveries. To the Norwegians, 
the lesson from 1940 was that it would be a 
mistake to rely on an implicit or unspoken 
Western guarantee of assistance in case of an 
attack. The intention of military cooperation had 
to be formalised beforehand and prepared by 
joint planning. The demand for a formal tie to 
the Western powers thus reflected a principal 
security consideration on the Norwegian side. 
The failed Scandinavian negotiations and the 
subsequent Norwegian and Danish entry into the 
North Atlantic Treaty have been extensively 
debated by several historians, and a thorough 
discussion of this literature lies beyond the 
scope of this article. 20 It seems clear, however, 
that the Scandinavian negotiations failed because 
Norway and Sweden could not agree on the 
character of the defence union. The Swedes 
insisted on strict neutrality, and whereas the 
Norwegians were willing to go long a way to 
find a compromise, they refused to give up the 
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demand of a Western connection of some kind. 
Despite Danish attempts to mediate, sufficient 
common ground could not be found. When 
Norway consequently decided to join the North 
Atlantic Pact in early 1949, Denmark followed 
suit, if somewhat hesitantly. 
Which role did the American aid programmes 
play in the Scandinavian alliance question? There 
were two American programmes that could 
influence the Scandinavian decision: firstly, the 
Marshall Plan and secondly, the American Arms 
Assistance Programme - that was in the making 
but not yet implemented when Norway and 
Denmark made their choice. 
The first question that should be considered 
is whether the Danes and the Norwegians 
assumed, or were led to think, that joining the 
Atlantic Treaty would result in more Marshall 
aid. It is a fact that the Norwegians obtained a 
substantial rise in the their portion of Marshall 
aid during the spring of 1948, at the same time 
as they abandoned the bridge building policy and 
started a reorientation towards the West. 
However, this was because the Norwegians 
themselves no longer saw any political reasons 
for keeping their requests as low as possible. 
Since the credibility of the bridgebuilding policy 
was no longer at stake, the Norwegian 
government started to lobby for a considerable 
rise in the dollar contributions. The Norwegian 
negotiators did succeed to a certain degree, 
partly because the Americans noticed the 
simultaneous Norwegian reorientation towards 
the West and wanted to encourage it. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the 
Americans used the prospect of more Marshall 
aid to pull Norway towards the Atlantic Pact. 
Certainly, it is reasonable to assume that 
Norwegian requests to expand the proportion of 
dollar aid would have been met with less 
sympathy if they had been combined with a 
stubborn Norwegian insistence on keeping a 
demonstratively non-aligned foreign policy line. 
However, the Norwegian foreign policy 
reorientation was apremise of the Norwegian 
requests for more aid, not a result. Since the 
reorientation preceded the Norwegian 
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renegotiation of the dollar amounts, the 
American response could only serve to 
encourage a development that was already on its 
way.21 
A second issue regarding the significance of 
American aid for the Scandinavian alliance 
decision, is whether the hope of obtaining arms 
assistance from the United States played a 
decisive role. From a military point of view, 
there could be no doubt that there was a 
desperate need for cheap arms deliveries. The 
Norwegian and Danish armed forces were very 
weak in the early years after the war, sorely 
lacking in arms and other equipment. At first 
this led the Swedes to demand that the actual 
implementation of a Scandinavian defence pact 
would have to wait a few years, until Norwegian 
and Danish armed forces had become stronger. 
(At this time the Swedes themselves possessed 
the second largest military force in Western 
Europe, surpassed only by the British.) In the 
concluding phase of the Scandinavian 
negotiations, the Swedes did accept bringing the 
defence union into function at once. It was 
clear, however, that the Danes and the 
Norwegians would face heavy investments in 
weaponry if the defence union was to be 
realised. If these weapons were to be purchased 
at full price on the open market, it would mean a 
heavy drain on the currency reserves of both 
countries - reserves much needed for civilian 
reconstruction. In order to limit defence 
expenditures, the Danes and Norwegians 
therefore hoped that it would be possible for a 
Scandinavian defence union to obtain cheap 
weapons deliveries from the United States under 
the Vandenberg Resolution. Norwegian inquiries 
in Washington seemed to indicate, however, that 
a Scandinavian defence union would not be 
given priority when it came to cheap arms 
deliveries. While the Danes and the Swedes 
assumed that the Americans would back down if 
faced with the establishment of a Scandinavian 
union as a fait accompli, the Norwegians were 
more inclined to take the initial American 
response at face value." 
Given their preference of having at least 
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Norway and Denmark in the North Atlantic 
Treaty, it is difficult to see how the Americans 
could have responded more positively to the 
requests for preferential treatment for a 
Scandinavian defence union. Hence, the 
American response can hardly be construed as 
pressure. What might still be a matter of 
discussion, however, is the relative importance 
of the arms support issue for the Danish and 
Norwegian decision to join the North Atlantic 
Treaty. In order to discuss this question, two 
other categories of explanatory factors should 
be considered: security concerns and domestic 
factors. 
Historians writing on Norway have generally 
argued that security considerations were more 
important than the prospect of obtaining arms 
assistance. Helge Pharo is clear on his view of 
the priorities of the Norwegian government: 
'[a]s far as the cabinet was concerned, arms 
deliveries were a secondary issue, an acceptable 
opening to the West was a sine qua non.''' 
Norway has a long coast towards the Atlantic, 
and a security guarantee from the North Atlantic 
powers was considered vital. Admittedly, having 
Sweden as an ally would greatly enhance 
Norwegian security, but in the face of a massive 
Soviet attack, it would not be sufficient. 
Norway did not share the Swedish (and to some 
degree the Danish) assumption that the Western 
powers would come to Scandinavia's assistance 
out of their own interest. The belief in such an 
implicit Western security guarantee had been the 
basis of Norwegian foreign policy before 1940, 
and had proven insufficient when Norway was 
attacked by Germany. 
Security considerations can also serve to 
explain the greater Danish interest in Sweden as 
an ally. Given Denmark's extremely exposed 
position as a small and easily conquered 
appendage ofthe Continent, it would be valuable 
to have a strong ally situated close by. Sweden 
was situated just across the straits and could -
at least in theory - send military support within 
hours.24 In contrast, there were few American 
troops stationed on the Continent at the time, 
and it was not likely that they would be sent to 
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help Denmark, should war break out. (On the 
other hand, Western troops fighting against a 
Soviet attack in Northern Germany would 
indirectly protect Denmark whether the Danes 
were members of the Atlantic Pact or not). The 
prospect of Swedish troops being sent to assist 
Denmark in a war may seem like wishful 
thinking. However, one might speculate that the 
Danes still considered a Swedish security 
guarantee to be of a certain value as a source of 
deterrence. Perhaps - they might have hoped -
the Soviets would refrain from attacking 
Denmark during a general advance on the 
Continent if such an attack would automatically 
bring them into a war with neutral Sweden. 
After all, Sweden had a relatively sizeable 
military force, and it might be in Soviet interest 
to keep Sweden neutral. If, on the other hand, 
Denmark was not allied to Sweden, there would 
be no reason why the Soviets should refrain 
from the relatively easy task of occupying the 
tiny country as part of a Continental campaign. 
Compared to their Norwegian colleagues, 
Danish historians have generally attached 
somewhat more importance to domestic factors 
when explaining the alliance preferences of the 
Danish government in 1948-49. Indeed, in a 
recent article by Karl Molin and Thorsten B. 
Olesen, domestic factors are described as more, 
or at least equally important as security 
considerations in deciding the policies of the 
Danish government. Visions of Scandinavian 
unity and cooperation - "Scandinavianism"-
had a strong position in Danish public opinion 
and in several political parties. In relation to 
Norway, the neutrality policy of Sweden in the 
first part of the war had to some extent soured 
relations, but to the Danes, the experiences from 
the war rather seemed to demonstrate the 
necessity of Scandinavian cohesion in the 
future. Moreover, the Danish Social Democrats 
might also have had domestic political motives 
for promoting a Scandinavian alliance. The 
Danish Social Democrats were not as strong as 
their Scandinavian sister-parties, and the Social 
Democratic government in power from 1947-50 
did not command a majority in the Parliament. 
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Cooperation with the strong Labour 
governments of their Scandinavian neighbours 
must have seemed attractive. Together the 
Scandinavian Labour parties could create a small 
'third way' bloc that would be a showroom for 
planned economy, social security and 
bridge building policies. In the long run, this 
could boost the support for the Danish Social 
Democrats and perhaps give them a domestic 
position comparable to their Scandinavian 
counterparts. Domestic concerns can thus serve 
to explain the strong pro-Scandinavian 
sentiments of the Danish government." 
Norwegian domestic sentiments, in contrast, 
gave less clear directions for the policymakers. 
The public opinion in Norway was divided and 
uncertain.26 The non-socialist opposition was 
mostly in favour of Norwegian membership in 
an Atlantic alliance and sceptical of the 
Scandinavian option. The Labour Party was 
split, however, and many party members were 
uncertain and hesitant. A small, but vocal 
opposition was clearly negative to Western 
alignment in any form. However, the ministers 
of defence and foreign affairs were strongly 
oriented towards the West, as were most of the 
leading figures in the party leadership, especially 
in the party organisation in Oslo. Still, it seems 
that most leading Labour Party politicians would 
have preferred a Scandinavian defence union, 
granted that it had sufficient ties to the West. 
Since Sweden insisted that a Scandinavian 
defence union would have to be based on strict 
neutrality, this option was excluded, however. 
The supporters of a Western solution therefore 
ended up supporting a membership in the 
Atlantic Treaty. The head of the Labour Party, 
Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, seemed to lean 
towards a Scandinavian union, although he 
avoided taking a firm position in public during 
the course of the negotiations. When he finally 
made up his mind, however, he threw his weight 
behind the Atlantic option. This finally tipped the 
scales in the party organisation, and only small 
groups of opponents to membership in the 
Atlantic Treaty remained. Joining the Atlantic 
Treaty seemed to constitute the least splitting 
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alternative domestically, both for the Norwegian 
Labour Party and for Norwegian opinion at 
large. That is not to say that it appeared totally 
impossible to obtain broad domestic acceptance 
for a Scandinavian solution. Given the volatile 
and hesitant sentiments in the public opinion as 
well as among politicians across the political 
spectrum, the government had a genuine 
possibility of employing its prestige to sway the 
opinion in one direction or the other. 
In assessing the importance of the various 
factors behind the choice to join the Atlantic 
Treaty, historians writing on Norway have 
hence put security first. Domestic factors 
pointed in different directions. The hope of 
obtaining more Marshall aid as an Atlantic 
Treaty member was uncertain at the best. Cheap 
arms deliveries were indeed desirable, but it was 
first and foremost a security guarantee from the 
United States that counted. 
It might be misleading, however, to consider 
the issue of arms deliveries in isolation from the 
security guarantee of the alliance. Most 
European decision makers probably took it 
almost for granted that an Atlantic alliance 
would include arms aid that would make it 
easier for the Europeans to defend themselves 
while waiting for American reinforcements. 
Even without the Vandenberg Resolution, there 
would probably have been the general 
expectation that American aid would be 
forthcoming. Such an assumption could be 
based partly on the memory of the Lend-Lease 
Programme of the Second World War, and 
partly on the positive experiences of the ongoing 
European Recovery Programme. 
However, even if the security guarantee and 
the prospects of arms assistance were almost 
inseparable in the minds of the decision makers, 
it might still be argued that military aid did play a 
particular role in paving the way for domestic 
consensus in Norway. The apparent lack of 
cheap arms deliveries for a Scandinavian option 
was decisive to some Labour party members 
who would have preferred the Scandinavian 
solution, but who found it even more important 
to keep arms expenditures low. The belief in the 
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American will and ability to supply arms to 
members of the future Atlantic Treaty, but not 
to a non-aligned defence union, probably made 
some Labour party members abandon the 
Scandinavian option. Thus, instead of 
discussing which of the factors that was most 
important in bringing Norway into the Atlantic 
Pact, one could focus on the reciprocal 
relationship between them. For Norway's part, 
it appears that all the factors reinforced one 
another in pointing towards an Atlantic solution: 
it gave more credible protection than a neutral 
Scandinavian union, it was the best basis for 
constructing domestic political consensus, it 
would give an economic gain through cheap 
arms deliveries, and, possibly, easier access to 
more Marshall aid. All these considerations 
together seems to have played a role for the final 
outcome. 
Furthermore, when the role of the American 
aid programmes for the final outcome of the 
alliance question is considered, its general 
influence on Norwegian and Danish sentiments 
should also be kept in mind. It might be true that 
the expectation of more Marshall aid for 
members of the Atlantic Treaty in itself did not 
have a decisive impact on the Norwegian 
decision. However, the European Recovery 
Programme played an important role in creating 
a positive image of the United States in Norway, 
as in the rest of Western Europe. The belief that 
the United States could indeed offer a credible 
security guarantee combined with substantial 
arms assistance was to a large extent 
conditioned by this image of generosity and 
benevolence. In addition, of course, the 
Americans possessed the most powerful weapon 
in the world, the atomic bomb. The trust in 
American power and resources was a part of 
the general sentiments of both top-ranking 
decision-makers and the general opinion. 
IFS Into 2/98 
>-_. 
-
3 - Security and Economy Come 
Together: Scandinavian Alliance 
Policies and the Arms Assistance 
Programme 
During the first year of the existence of the 
North Atlantic Pact, Norway and Denmark saw 
few concrete results of the new security 
arrangement. The outbreak of the Korean War 
changed this. The North Atlantic Treaty was 
transformed into an integrated defence 
organisation, it was expanded to include Turkey 
and Greece, and the process towards rearming 
Germany started. During this period of 
unprecedented military build-up in peacetime, 
both Norway and Denmark received large 
amounts of American arms and equipment. 
Before the outbreak of the Korean War only a 
few shipments of equipment had been received, 
but after the North Korean attack on its 
Southern neighbour, arms deliveries from the 
United States rose dramatically. By February 
1953 Norway had received equipment with an 
estimated value of 159 million dollars.21 Thanks 
to the arms shipments pouring in from the 
Americans, the small European allies could to a 
large degree concentrate their own military 
spending on training personnel and building 
infrastructure. In addition, NATO's 
infrastructure programme paid for some of the 
facilities, noticeably airports. 
At the same time, the Americans used a 
carrot-and-stick strategy in order to encourage 
the receiving countries to spend more on 
defence purposes themselves. Higher domestic 
defence budgets would lead to more aid from 
the United States, whereas a failure to increase 
military spending could result in American 
cutbacks. The Norwegians increased military 
expenditure considerably. From 357 million 
Norwegian Kroner in 1950, the defence budget 
tripled in three years and passed one billion in 
1953.28 Denmark, however, was less 
susceptible to American pressure. The 
Americans held out the promise of both dollar 
aid and arms assistance as incentives in order to 
make the Danes spend more on defence. The 
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Danish government did expand their defence 
budgets, but by less than any other NATO state. 
Despite her refusal to meet American demands, 
Denmark still continued to receive arms aid 
from the United States, although by late 1953 
Norway's share of the shipments was 
considerably higher than the Danish one." 
Norwegian and Danish policies in connection 
with the arms assistance programmes should be 
analysed in terms of the balancing act that 
characterised the alliance policies of the two 
countries. 
Having joined the North Atlantic Treaty, 
Norwegian authorities had to reconcile several 
conflicting aims. On the one hand, it was 
important that the membership in the North 
Atlantic Treaty actually constituted a credible 
deterrent in relation to the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, it had to be made clear to the 
Soviets that Norway did not constitute an 
offensive threat. The Soviet Union should 
preferably be deterred and reassured at the same 
time. In relation to the alliance, Norway also had 
interests that pointed in different directions: 
Norway needed arms deliveries as well as 
credible plans for allied reinforcement in war, 
but Norwegian sovereignty and freedom of 
action should be protected from allied 
infringements. Norwegian authorities hence 
wanted to strengthen allied attention to 
Norway's security needs, while simultaneously 
working to limit the practical consequences of 
such attention. Domestic concerns reinforced 
these tendencies: the government wished to 
avoid provoking the left wing of the Labour 
Party. Even in the non-socialist opposition there 
was widespread scepticism to the growing 
Norwegian integration into the alliance. Rolf 
Tamnes has pointed at the dynamics of > 
Norwegian alliance policies.3• Measures 
strengthening the deterrence aspects of the 
policy frequently led to parallel efforts to 
reassure the Soviet Union. The process of 
integration into NATO structures were 
simultaneously countered by measures limiting 
the effects of allied presence. Norwegian 
policies thus oscillated between deterrence and 
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reassurance, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and 
between integration into the alliance and 
screening from its undesired effects. The 
Norwegian wish to reassure the Soviet Union of 
her peaceful intentions and restrict allied 
presence in Norway was reflected in the so-
called 'base declaration' of February 1949, 
stating that foreign troops would not be 
stationed on Norwegian soil unless there was a 
war or a threat of war. 
Danish foreign policy can be analysed in 
terms of the same conflicting aims. In his 
voluminous work on Danish postwar security 
policies, Poul Villaume has to some degree 
adopted the analytical tools of his Norwegian 
colleagues.3I Nicolai Petersen has analysed 
Danish alliance policies in terms of the tension 
between the fear of entrapment (being 
dominated and losing freedom of manoeuvre) 
and abandonment (provoking the allies in a way 
that would put the security guarantee in peril)." 
There were, however, some noticeable 
differences between Norway and Denmark. A 
much larger proportion of the Danish population 
remained sceptical to NATO; in opinion polls 
during the 1950s, only half of the Danish 
population supported Danish NATO-
membership. Domestic concerns therefore 
called for more caution. Partly due to 
Denmark's geographical position and historical 
experiences, the Danish attitude was marked by 
a certain fatalism and a feeling that domestic 
defence measures would be futile. As noticed 
above, Denmark was - and is - a small and 
easily conquered isthmus of the Continent. If 
NATO was successful in defending North 
Germany, Denmark would be spared. If not, the 
Soviets would be able to seize Denmark in a 
matter of hours. In any case, Danish defence 
efforts would make but a marginal difference. 
This made it possible for Denmark to play the 
role as a free rider in the joint Atlantic defence. 
The Norwegians, in contrast, had a stronger 
belief in the value of building a strong defence 
that could delay the advance of Soviet troops 
until allied reinforcements were in place. The 
Danes consequently spent considerably less than 
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Norway on defence: for the fiscal year \950-51 
Norway's defence expenditure was 50 per cent 
higher than Denmark's if calculated as a 
percentage of GNP. Apart from Greenland, 
where the Americans were given extensive base 
rights, Denmark followed Norway's policies of 
no allied bases in peacetime. Just like Norway, 
Denmark wanted to strike a balance between 
different aims, but the actual point of balance 
was even less accepting to American demands. 
After signing the North Atlantic Treaty, both 
countries were eager to receive arms aid from 
the United States. Denmark launched insistent 
appeals for expedient arms aid. The Norwegians 
did not repeat the negotiation strategy that had 
been employed in relation to the Marshall Plan 
two years earlier. As opposed to the situation in 
1947 there were no foreign policy concerns that 
would justify Norwegian restraint, and the 
Norwegian requests for military aid 
consequently reflected a wish to get as large a 
piece of the cake as possible. 33 
Both countries, however, wanted to restrict 
the number of Americans in the Military 
Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) that were 
going to monitor the aid programmes. The 
Americans wanted the groups to consist of 60-
65 persons: around 50 military men and 10-15 
civilians. However, both countries managed to 
limit the number of officers, to 22 in Norway 
and 26 in Denmark. The civilian administrative 
personnel were camouflaged as "administrative 
support" to the U.S. Embassies." This was not 
the last word to be said in this matter, however. 
The Americans kept pushing for more personnel 
after the outbreak of the Korean War. The 
Norwegians gradually though reluctantly gave 
in, and as a result, the gap between the official 
number of persons working for MAAG and the 
real figure kept growing. In 1953 fewer than 
half of the Americans working in the Norwegian 
advisory group - now a total number of 73 -
were officially acknowledged as MAAG 
personnel. 35 
What were the motives behind the insistence 
on keeping the number of advisers as low as' 
possible? For both countries, an important 
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motive seems to have been the fear of domestic 
criticism. In Norway both the left wing of the 
Labour Party and large segments of the non-
socialist opposition guarded the base policy 
closely, and were highly critical of any signs 
that the number of American military personnel 
permanently stationed in Norway was rising. In 
discussions with the Americans, the Norwegians 
voiced a fear that the presence of American 
servicemen might seem provocative to the 
Norwegian population and create anti-American 
feelings.'· The Danes reminded the Americans 
that the memories of the Nazi occupation were 
still vivid, and that the population would react to 
any sign of foreign military dominance." The 
emphasis on secrecy and the insistence by both 
the Danish and the Norwegian government that 
the MAAG personnel should not wear uniforms 
seem to confirm that such concerns were 
deeply felt in the governments. But there were 
also other considerations behind the resistance 
to increase the number of advisers. Neither the 
Danish nor the Norwegian government were 
attracted by the idea of being monitored by a 
large number of Americans. The emphasis on 
sovereignty and national freedom of action, 
particularly prevalent in Norway, was not easily 
squared with the American wish to instruct the 
Scandinavians on how to run their armed 
forces. Furthermore, one might speculate that 
the Danes feared that a large American military 
mission would be employed to put even more 
pressure on Denmark to make her increase her 
military expenses. The fear of provoking the 
Soviet Union might also have been a motive 
behind the Scandinavian resistance against a 
large number of American uniformed military 
advisors. In addition there might have been an 
economic motive behind the insistence on 
restricting the number of MAAG personnel, 
since the administrative costs of the mission 
were to be covered by the host country. The 
final outcome was a compromise between the 
need to satisfy American demands and the 
combination of factors that gave reason to be 
restrictive. 
Because of the ongoing aid programmes, the 
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United States had three different diplomatic 
missions in Denmark and Norway - the ECA 
mission, the MAAG and the US Embassy itself. 
In Norway, both the ECA mission and the 
MAAG were on close terms with the relevant 
Norwegian authorities, and leading 
representatives had weekly, at times almost 
daily, contact with cabinet members and the 
highest echelons of the civil service, and, in the 
case of the MAAG, the military chiefs of staff. 
To a certain extent the Norwegians managed to 
turn the local ECA representatives into 
spokesmen for Norwegian interests in relation to 
the ECA in Paris and Washington. However, the 
Norwegians had considerably greater problems 
converting the MAAG representatives to the 
Norwegian creed. The American military 
mission remained highly critical of Norwegian 
defence policies. The representatives found that 
the number of Norwegian standing forces was 
too small, that the conscription period was too 
short, and that there was a lack of adequately 
trained professional personnel. In addition, the 
Norwegian reluctance to accept an increase in 
the number of American advisors was a source 
of constant irritation." 
From the spring of 1951 the Norwegian 
ability to absorb U.S. equipment created a 
serious conflict. The American military advisors 
felt that the Norwegians lacked the manpower 
and structures both to put the equipment into 
use and to maintain it properly. The MAAG 
suggested that the arms deliveries should be 
postponed in order for the Norwegians to follow 
up on the American demands. The Norwegians 
reacted strongly against this threat. In the end 
the Americans chose not to carry out the threat 
of postponements. The primary reason was the 
ongoing negotiation of base rights in Norway 
for the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The 
strategic importance of this agreement overruled 
the wish to employ sanctions against the 
Norwegians in the arms assistance question. 
However, the Norwegians themselves also 
reluctantly accepted that the Norwegian armed 
forces could improve their ability to utilise the 
equipment that was received. In the late autumn 
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of 1951, the government proposed extra 
appropriations for infrastructure and increased 
the number of military personnel in order to 
correct the deficiencies.39 
The MAAG in Denmark was even more 
critical of the defence efforts of their hosts. Not 
only did Denmark have the lowest number of 
men in uniform as a part of the total population 
amog the allies; one of the American advisors 
allegedly even doubted that the Danish forces 
would fight in the event of a war.'" Denmark 
was under constant pressure to spend more on 
defence. Both the prospect of dollar aid and the 
threat of cutbacks in arms assistance were 
employed. The Americans succeeded only to a 
limited degree, however. As Danish dollar 
holdings rose, Denmark in fact rejected the 
offer of more financial aid, chiefly because 
Danish authorities wanted to avoid American 
pressure to expand the military budgets.41 In 
1954 Denmark had the lowest level of military 
preparedness of all NATO states. In the spring 
of 1955, the Americans actually considered 
terminating the military aid programme to 
Denmark altogether. This was not effectuated, 
however. It was feared that a termination of the 
aid programme could create problems for 
American base rights on Greenland, and perhaps 
even make Denmark leave the alliance.4' Just as 
in Norway's case, essential American strategic 
interests precluded carrying out the most wide-
ranging threats in practice. Denmark kept 
receiving arms aid, despite her defiant attitude to 
American demands. It is still safe to assume, 
however, that Denmark would have received 
more equipment had she been willing to spend 
more on military purposes herself. 
Despite Norway's greater will to intensify the 
military build-up, the Americans felt that 
Norwegian efforts left much to be desired. The 
American criticism of the level of Norwegian 
military expenditure faded somewhat as a result 
of the Norwegian extraordinary appropriations 
during the summer of 1951. In June of that 
year, the Norwegian Parliament appropriated an 
extra 410 million Norwegian Kroner over two 
years to improve military preparedness, and the 
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conscription period was extended to 12 months 
for all personnel.4J The Americans were largely 
satisfied with these steps, although they still 
found the conscription period too short. For the 
time being, however, the MAAG, the ECA 
mission and the US Embassy all agreed that 
Norwegian defence expenditure was reaching 
the limit of what was economically and 
politically feasible. In 1952, the promise of 
direct dollar aid to defence purposes in addition 
to equipment deliveries spurred the Norwegians 
to allocate even larger sums to defence 
purposes. The length of the conscription period 
was extended to 18 months in the Navy and the 
Air Force, and Army conscription was later 
extended to 16 months. The carrot-and-stick 
strategy of the United States had worked. From 
1953 onwards, the Americans were generally 
satisfied with the Norwegian defence build-up, 
although they still found it wanting in some 
respects. 44 
In the early 1950s American and allied 
demands on Danish and Norwegian defence 
preparedness was a source of domestic political 
tension in both countries. There were critical 
voices to the defence build-up in all of the 
Danish parties. Tensions were building in the 
Social Democratic party, which supported the 
foreign policy of the Liberal-Conservative 
government but felt exceedingly uneasy in the 
face of the growing defence expenditures." In 
Norway, the most pro-Western sections of the 
Labour Party were in favour of rising defence 
expenditure and expanding the armed forces in 
order to fulfil the ambitious NATO aims. The 
majority of the cabinet members of the Torp 
government, which replaced the Gerhardsen 
government in November 1951, even wanted to 
discard the established policy of not allowing 
foreign bases in peacetime. The government 
wanted to accept three American fighter wings 
to be permanently stationed in Norway. 
However, it met strong opposition from a 
majority of representatives of all political parties 
in the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign 
Affairs, and the American offer had to be turned 
down.46 The Danes had received a similar offer 
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and were initially positive, but also turned it 
down, partly because of the Norwegian 
rejection." The extension of the conscription 
period also led to bitter struggles within the 
Norwegian Labour Party, and the government 
failed to mobilise support in the party for the 
extension that the Americans and NATO 
desired." 
Conclusion 
This article has discussed whether and in what 
way the American aid programmes contributed 
to pulling Norway and Denmark into the 
Western bloc and integrating them into a 
Western security system. In the first part of the 
article we saw that Norway initially was more 
hesitant than Denmark to accept the offer of 
Marshall aid. Both the initial Norwegian 
scepticism and the subsequent decision to 
participate were based on a number of general 
considerations, including the foreign policy 
orientation of Norway, general trade patterns 
and domestic sentiments. Urgent economical 
needs did not play the same role in Norway as in 
Denmark, since at the time of Marshall 's 
speech, the Norwegian currency situation, 
although difficult, was not seen as precarious. 
Only a short time after, however, it became 
clear that Norway faced a severe dollar crisis. 
The more immediate positive reaction in 
Denmark can largely be explained by the urgent 
currency crisis that the country was faced with. 
The second part discussed the influence of 
the American aid programmes in the Danish and 
Norwegian decision to join the Atlantic Treaty. 
We have seen that the hopes of obtaining more 
Marshal! aid probably did not affect the choice 
between a Scandinavian defence union and the 
Western alliance. The question of American 
arms assistance did play a role in the failed 
Scandinavian negotiations, but Norwegian 
historians have still concluded that the primary 
Norwegian motive for choosing the Western 
alliance was the security guarantee from the 
United States and Britain. It might be argued, 
however, that the prospect of arms aid for 
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members of an Atlantic Pact did contribute to 
convincing some hesitant Norwegian Labour 
members who feared that military expenses 
would be higher in an independent Scandinavian 
defence union. The arms issue does not seem to 
have played a decisive role in the deliberations 
on the Danish side, since the Danes expected 
the Americans to offer arms on favourable terms 
even to a strictly neutral Scandinavian defence 
union - despite American statements to the 
contrary. Instead, Danish historians have 
emphasised domestic concerns in explaining the 
policies of the Danish government during the 
Scandinavian negotiations. 
The third part examined the importance of 
the American Arms Assistance Programme in 
influencing Norwegian and Danish defence 
policies after the Atlantic Treaty had been 
signed. Both Norway and Denmark worked to 
get as much military equipment as possible from 
the United States once they had become 
members of the Atlantic Alliance. However, they 
were not overly enthusiastic about receiving 
large contingents of military advisers, and 
insisted on keeping the American presence as 
smal! and invisible as possible. Both countries 
reacted negatively to American criticism of the 
quality and organisation of their armed forces. 
Nevertheless Norway mostly followed NATO 
recommendations and increased her military 
budgets during the early 1950s. The Danes, 
however, refused to meet the demands of the 
alliance and soon lagged far behind her allies in 
defence spending. Still, the Americans did not 
terminate the Danish arms assistance 
programme. 
This article has shown that there are certain 
differences in emphasis between Norwegian and 
Danish historians dealing with the early years of 
the Cold War. Both Norwegian and Danish 
historians depict the policies as the product of 
an interaction between several factors, domestic 
and foreign. However, Norwegian historians 
have tended to stress general foreign policy 
considerations and attach particular emphasis to 
the security dimensions of crucial foreign policy 
decisions. The Danes have tended to put 
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somewhat more stress on domestic policies and 
economic concerns. To a certain degree, these 
tendencies can be seen in the works that have 
been examined in this article, although the 
tendency is less pronounced in more recent 
works. Still, his article has shown that there is 
reason to emphasise the similarities between 
Denmark and Norway, especially in relation to 
the Marshall Plan and the American Arms 
Assistance Programme. 
What, then, can be said about the relative 
influence ofthe Marshall Plan and the American 
Arms Assistance Programme on the foreign 
policy orientation of Denmark and Norway? To 
what extent can it be claimed that these aid 
programmes contributed to pulling Norway and 
Denmark towards the west? This article has 
shown that the prospect of receiving American 
aid did not play a decisive role in redirecting the 
foreign policies of the two countries in 1947-49. 
To a certain extent, it can actually be claimed 
that it was the other way around - Denmark and 
Norway accepted Marshall aid partly because 
they did not want to be associated with the 
other side of the emerging political divide in 
Europe. In other words: Norway and Denmark 
did not turn west because they were offered 
Marshall Aid; they accepted aid because they felt 
that they belonged to the West. We have also 
seen that the prospect of receiving arms 
assistance was a secondary issue in the process 
that made Norway and Denmark join the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 
That does not mean, however, that the 
massive influx of American aid did not affect the 
process that led Norway and Denmark from 
being non-aligned states to becoming members 
of an integrated Western defence alliance. The 
prospect of military assistance may not have 
played a decisive role for the decision to join the 
Atlantic Pact, but as we have seen, it may have 
played an indirect role in combination with other 
factors, at least for Norway. Moreover, the 
American willingness to support Europe that had 
been so clearly demonstrated by the Marshall 
Plan, lent credibility to the plans to create an 
effective Trans-Atlantic security treaty. Thus it 
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could be argued that the aid programmes paved 
the way for Norwegian and Danish participation 
in the Atlantic Treaty. Furthermore, when they 
had become members, the implementation of the 
Military Assistance Programme encouraged the 
two countries to adapt themselves to the military 
integration and institutionalisation of the alliance 
that took place after the outbreak of the Korean 
War. The American aid programmes created and 
reinforced the image of the United States as an 
immensely wealthy and powerful nation willing 
to share some of that wealth with those who 
were to be her allies. In the first decade after 
the war, this image constituted an essential part 
of the intellectual and emotional setting for both 
top-ranking decision-makers and the general 
public. 
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